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“The essential point”, according to Wilfrid Sellars, “is that in 
characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we 
are not giving an empirical description of that episode or 
state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of 
justifying and being able to justify what one says”. (Sellars 
1997, 76) The traditional empiricism maintains that all of 
our knowledge rests basically on a foundation of truths 
about sensory experience, assuming that sense data is the 
junction at which external reality or the empirical world gets 
in touch with the epistemic world. Even Quine’s attack on 
the dogmas of empiricism does not call this presupposition 
into question. What he pleads for is a holistic modification 
of the dogma: “our statements about the external world 
face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but 
only as a corporate body” (Quine 1964, 41). 
In the spirit of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investiga-
tions, Sellars points out that there is a categorical 
difference between sensing and knowing, i.e., between the 
so-called “space of causes” and the “space of reasons”. At 
the heart of Sellars’ well-known criticism of the “Myth of the 
Given” is the recognition of the irreducibly normative 
character of epistemic discourse. Experience is certainly 
not irrelevant to knowledge, it may be a necessary 
condition of empirical knowledge, but not one that is 
constitutive of it, since the relevance of experience is 
primarily of a causal sort instead of a justificatory one. 
Davidson makes it clear that “a causal explanation of a 
belief does not show how or why the belief is justified” 
(Davidson 2001a, 143) and therefore “nothing can count 
as a reason for holding a belief except another belief” 
(Davidson 2001a, 141). Telling a “justificatory story” is, in 
Wittgensteinian terms, a language-game on its own to 
which one can contribute nothing by introducing a “causal 
story” (Rorty 1991, 148). 
Nevertheless, rejecting the myth of the given unavoid-
ably gives rise to the question whether or in what way the 
space of reasons, which is then free from all constraints 
from outside, still has any bearing on external reality. In 
this paper, we approach the problem the other way round: 
what we are concerned with is the question whether it is 
justified to assume a “space of reasons” at all. The 
problem is that if we accept that we are living in the “space 
of causes” in which everything that happens is determined 
in a causal chain, it is hard to see where there is place for 
us to engage in cognitive activities. For “the space of 
reasons is”, as McDowell remarks, “the realm of freedom” 
(McDowell 1994, 5). 
The epistemic discourse is founded on the possibility of 
distinguishing between “true” and “false” beliefs, between 
“correct” and “incorrect” inferences and so on. However, it 
would not make sense at all to speak of “truth” or “correct-
ness”, if cognitive activities were not free from causal 
necessitation, since, in this case, every mental process 
would simply be a mechanical process which can neither 
be correct nor incorrect. Only where there is a possibility of 
disobeying a rule is there the possibility of being correct. 
Our epistemic discourse presupposes that we can be 
taken responsible for what we say and believe. Therefore, 
the possibility of holding true beliefs and making correct 
inferences depends on the capacity of our mind to use 
reason on our own, independent of the causal necessita-
tion from outside. We human beings must be free in a way 
that other objects are not, if it is justified to call ourselves 
rational beings. We must attribute to our mind a capacity of 
what Kant calls spontaneity. 
In fact, Sellars’ distinction between the “space of 
causes” and the “space of reasons” is anticipated by Kant. 
In response to Hume’s challenge of the rationalistic 
conception of causality, Kant recognizes that the objectiv-
ity of knowledge claims cannot be based on what is given 
in sensation, but rather it is a matter of applying concepts 
in accordance with the normative principles derived from 
the categories of understanding. Knowing or thinking, 
therefore, must be regarded as an “achievement” of the 
spontaneity of our mind, which is governed by principles of 
reason instead of natural causes. This autonomous sphere 
is referred to by Kant as the “realm of freedom”, the “world 
of understanding” or the “intelligible world”, in contrast to 
the “realm of nature” or the “world of sense”. Indeed Kant’s 
framework seems to be particularly suitable for bringing 
the problem we are interested in to a head because of the 
particularly intractable form of the conflict he is confronted 
with, i.e., the so-called antinomy between causality and 
freedom (A 444 ff./B 472 ff.).1 
As far as the “realm of nature” is concerned, Kant 
endorses a strict version of causal determinism, maintain-
ing that everything that happens is, without exception, 
determined by natural laws. “One can therefore grant that 
if it were possible for us to have such deep insight into a 
human being’s cast of mind, ... we could calculate a 
human being’s conduct for the future with as much 
certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse”. (Kant 1996a, 219) 
Kant, however, believes on the other hand that “it is just as 
impossible for the most subtle philosophy as for the most 
common human reason to argue freedom away” (Kant 
1996b, 102). Kant’s main concern is that if human beings 
were not capable of acting freely it would make no sense 
to speak of moral responsibility. Nevertheless, Kant also 
recognizes that the problem of freedom is not only crucial 
for the possibility of moral imputation but also for that of 
epistemic claim. Kant’s distinction between sensibility and 
understanding or between the faculty of receptivity and 
that of spontaneity is drawn based on the recognition that 
the objectivity of knowledge cannot be sought in what is 
given from the space of causes, but rather in the concepts 
“produced” by ourselves. In order to make sense of 
epistemic claims, the “world of understanding” must be 
presupposed as an autonomous realm in which causal 
determinations are out of place. 
In the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason, Kant tries to 
show that there is no logical contradiction between taking 
something as determined and as free at the same time, 
insofar as a distinction between phenomena and noumena 
is accepted. Arguably, this distinction need not be under-
stood as a metaphysical one, as if there were a world of 
things-in-themselves existing “behind” the world of appear-
ance. Allison, for example, argues that the difference is 
rather a logical or methodological one, depending on 
whether something is considered as an object of experien-
ce or considered apart from the conditions of being an 
                                                     
1 References to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason appearing in the text are to the 
standard pagination of the first and second editions, indicated as A and B, 
respectively. English translations are from P. Guyer and A. W. Wood’s transla-
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 




empirical object (Allison 1983). Accordingly, causality and 
freedom refer to two different ways of viewing things. 
Under the “phenomenal perspective”, even our mental 
activities are determined by natural causes. However, to 
engage in cognitive activities means to consider ourselves 
no longer as “objects”, but as “subjects” of experience, i.e., 
to consider ourselves apart from the conditions to which all 
objects of experience are subject. Under this “noumenal 
perspective”, we regard ourselves as capable of using 
reason independently of non-cognitive causal factors. 
However, it is doubtful whether it is justified to view 
ourselves from the noumenal perspective. Obviously, it 
does not follow from the fact that we are compelled to 
regard ourselves as free for the sake of the epistemic 
discourse that we are really so. Although we believe 
ourselves to be capable of cognitive activities, this belief 
may be wrong. The whole story of spontaneity may be an 
illusion. As Sellars suggests, “we can conceive Kant to 
argue that although we are conscious of ourselves as 
spontaneous in the synthesizing of empirical objects, this 
spontaneity is still only a relative spontaneity, a spontane-
ity ‘set in motion’ by ‘foreign causes’” (Sellars 1974, 79). 
What Sellars means by “relative spontaneity” is the idea of 
an “automaton spirituale, a mind which conceptualizes, but 
only in response to challenges from without, and in ways 
which, however varied, realize set dispositions.” (Sellars 
1974, 81) For such a thinking machine, all cognitive activi-
ties are nothing but causal processes which are initiated 
by perceptive inputs and the result of which are generated 
according to the dispositions programmed in the machine. 
Nevertheless, the idea of “relative spontaneity” does not 
undermine the assumption of freedom. The crucial point in 
Kant’s idea is that how we consider ourselves under 
noumenal perspective has nothing to do with what we are 
under the phenomenal perspective. One may object that if 
we regard ourselves as free, but we, in fact, are not, then 
this is nothing but a mere phantom. This objection, 
however, would only stand if freedom were a “matter of 
fact” that could either “be the case or not the case”. But, as 
shown in the resolution of the Third Antinomy, freedom ex 
hypothesi does not belong to the phenomenal or factual 
world at all. Therefore, whether there is freedom or not is 
the wrong question to ask. Admitting a realm of freedom or 
a world of understanding says nothing about what the 
empirical world is like. Kant makes it clear that “the 
concept of a world of understanding is … only a standpoint 
that reason sees itself constrained to take outside appear-
ances in order to think of itself as practical”. (Kant 1996b, 
104) 
In re-interpreting Kant’s ideas, Brandom tries to reinforce 
the crucial point by introducing another pair of concepts, 
namely “objective” and “social”. With the objective/social 
distinction, Brandom succeeds in figuring out positively 
what it means by saying that freedom is not a matter of 
fact. “The social/objective distinction is social rather than 
objective. If we now transfer this account of the distinction 
between the Realm of Nature (fact, description, cause) and 
the Realm of Freedom (norm, evaluation, practice) back to 
Kant’s original suggestion that freedom consists in 
constraint by norms rather than simply by causes, the 
difference between being free and not being free becomes 
a social rather than an objective difference.” (Brandom 
1979, 192)2 For Brandom, it is up to a social community to 
decide on the matter of freedom. An unwelcome conse-
                                                     
2 Brandom believes that the objective/social distinction is superior to the 
traditional one between fact and norm with which the possibility of such a new 
perspective would hardly come readily to mind, since it seems unintelligible to 
say that the fact/norm distinction is itself not factual, but normative (Brandom 
1979, 192). 
quence of this interpretation, however, is that the distinc-
tion becomes more or less arbitrary. As Brandom himself 
concedes, even “a tree or a rock can become subject to 
norms insofar as we consider it as engaging in social 
practices.” (Brandom 1979, 192)3 
Nevertheless, we need not follow Brandom up to this 
point. We can distinguish between the Positive and the 
Negative Thesis of Brandom’s interpretation, i.e., between 
the thesis that the distinction between the realm of nature 
and the realm of freedom is a social practice and that the 
distinction is not objective or factual. Indeed the negative 
thesis makes good sense within Kant’s framework, for it is 
just another way to say that the difference between the two 
realms is not an ontological one. Lacking an “objective” 
ground, however, by no means implies that the distinction 
can be arbitrarily decided by a community. Indeed, 
according to Kant, freedom is necessary because it cannot 
be coherently argued away. For the price of rejecting 
freedom would be the price of abandoning the possibility of 
epistemic claims and cognitive activities at the same time. 
In this connection, someone who tries to argue against it 
would have to deny that he is engaging in the cognitive 
activity of reasoning. He would have to deny the very 
condition on the basis of which his argumentation 
operates, or, so to speak, to erode the very ground on 
which he stands. Therefore, we cannot coherently deny 
that we are capable of reasoning and operating in the 
space of reasons. Such a self-referential argumentation 
strategy is called “transcendental argument” (Strawson 
1959, 40). 
Moreover, even the space of causes would not make 
sense without presupposing the space of reasons. By 
saying that the social/objective distinction is social rather 
than objective, Brandom brings up another crucial point 
that is implicit in Kant’s idea: the spaces of reasons is a 
“meta-space” in respect to the space of causes. Where the 
space of causes begins and ends is itself not an objective 
matter. Instead it lies in the hands of reason to determine 
what objective is and what the space of causes is like. 
According to Kant, the categories that constitute the 
objectivity of the phenomenal world are “products” of our 
understanding. The world would not be a causally 
connected whole, if we did not presuppose a space of 
reasons which determines what causality means. The 
causal order of phenomena would have no objectivity, if 
we were not capable for applying the concept of causality 
independently of non-cognitive causal factors. In this 
respect, we must regard ourselves as free not only in order 
to make sense of ourselves as rational beings, but also to 
account for the facticity of the causally determined world. 
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